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The Law Office of David W. Smith reports notable rulings and case outcomes here when the matters are concluded and can appropriately be shared. Results depend on the facts of each case and are not a guarantee of any particular outcome.
Eleventh Circuit Reverses Qualified Immunity in Jones v. Ceinski
Eleventh Circuit Reverses Qualified Immunity in Jones v. Ceinski
Jones v. Ceinski, 136 F.4th 1057 (11th Cir. 2025)
The Law Office of David W. Smith obtained a published reversal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, representing Jeremy Jones on appeal with co-counsel from the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund.
In a unanimous opinion by Chief Judge William Pryor, joined by Judges Grant and Luck, the court held that an officer who choked and punched a subdued driver was not entitled to qualified immunity. The decision restores Mr. Jones’s Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim and remands the case for further proceedings.
Mr. Jones, a small-statured man with a severe congenital disability affecting his hands and feet, was stopped in Sarasota for a noncriminal traffic infraction. Viewing the summary-judgment record in his favor, the Eleventh Circuit described a stop in which he complied with the officer’s instructions, produced his license and registration, and volunteered his concealed-carry permit. After the officer saw a firearm under the driver’s seat, the officer grabbed Mr. Jones’s wrist, twisted his arm, and pushed him against the car. After he was subdued and could no longer reach the firearm, the officer placed him in a chokehold until he could not breathe and punched him in the head.
The Middle District of Florida had granted the officer qualified immunity. The Eleventh Circuit reversed. A reasonable jury, the court explained, could find the chokehold and punch were gratuitous excessive force. The right was clearly established: an officer may not use unprovoked force against a non-hostile, non-violent person who is under control, not resisting, and obeying commands. Initial restraint to keep Mr. Jones from an unsecured firearm could be reasonable. Additional force after he was secured could not. Minimal injury does not convert excessive force into de minimis force.
The case was remanded for further proceedings.
Results depend on the facts of each case and are not a guarantee of any particular outcome.
Second District Reverses Class Dismissal in Shaffer Foreclosure Appeal
Second District Reverses Class Dismissal in Shaffer Foreclosure Appeal
Shaffer v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., 235 So.3d 943 (Fla. 2d DCA July 18, 2025)
The Law Office of David W. Smith obtained a reversal in the Florida Second District Court of Appeal for Linda L. Shaffer in a Manatee County foreclosure action.
Ms. Shaffer counterclaimed for a declaration that Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as indenture trustee, cannot enforce the loan documents because it had issued her an IRS Form 1099-C reporting the debt as discharged. She brought that claim for herself and for a putative class of similarly situated borrowers. The circuit court (Judge Edward Nicholas) denied the bank’s motion to dismiss as to Ms. Shaffer individually but dismissed the class component of the count without written findings or conclusions of law.
Writing for a unanimous panel (Judge Rothstein-Youakim, joined by Judges Villanti and Moe), the Second District held that dismissing the class component “effectively denied class certification as a matter of law.” Under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.220(d)(1), an order granting or denying class treatment must separately state the findings of fact and conclusions of law on which it rests. The court also held that the 1099-C count was a compulsory counterclaim in the foreclosure, so the rule applied. It had jurisdiction to review the class-certification ruling under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(C)(vi), but not, at this stage, whether the count states a cause of action. The panel expressly took no position on the legal effect of the 1099-C.
The case was reversed and remanded for the circuit court to make the required findings and conclusions.
Results depend on the facts of each case and are not a guarantee of any particular outcome.
Eleventh Circuit Blocks IRS Foreclosure of a Family Home in Saccullo
Eleventh Circuit Blocks IRS Foreclosure of a Family Home in Saccullo
Saccullo v. United States, 913 F.3d 1010 (11th Cir. 2019)
The Law Office of David W. Smith obtained a published reversal in the Eleventh Circuit for Mark A. Saccullo, as successor trustee of the Anthony L. Saccullo Irrevocable Trust.
In 1998, Mark’s father recorded a deed conveying the family’s Charlotte County property to a trust for Mark’s benefit. The deed lacked a second witness required by Florida law. After Anthony died in 2005, the IRS treated the property as still in the estate, assessed nearly $1.4 million in estate tax, filed liens, seized the property, and obtained a district-court order of foreclosure and sale.
Writing for a unanimous panel (Judge Newsom, joined by Judges Marcus and Anderson), the Eleventh Circuit held that Florida’s curative statute, Fla. Stat. § 95.231(1), is self-executing. Five years after recording, the missing-witness defect was cured by operation of law, so good title passed to the trust in December 2003, two years before Anthony’s death. Because the United States’ estate-tax claim could not have accrued before death, the Summerlin rule (that the United States is not bound by state statutes of limitation) did not apply. The statute did not cut off a preexisting federal claim; it kept the property from ever becoming part of that claim.
The court reversed summary judgment on the government’s foreclosure claim as to the property and remanded.
Results depend on the facts of each case and are not a guarantee of any particular outcome.
Eleventh Circuit Affirms Homeowners’ Defense of Architectural Copyright Suit
Eleventh Circuit Affirms Homeowners’ Defense of Architectural Copyright Suit
Medallion Homes Gulf Coast, Inc. v. Tivoli Homes of Sarasota, Inc., No. 15-15393 (11th Cir. July 26, 2016) (unpublished)
The Law Office of David W. Smith represented Nicole Duke and Michael Duke on appeal in this unpublished Eleventh Circuit decision affirming summary judgment against a builder’s copyright claim.
Medallion Homes sued the Dukes, Tivoli Homes of Sarasota, and others, alleging that a house built from the “Duke” plan infringed Medallion’s copyrighted “Santa Maria” floor plan. The Middle District of Florida granted summary judgment to the defendants, holding that no reasonable jury could find the plans substantially similar at the level of protected expression.
A unanimous per curiam panel (Judges Jordan, Julie Carnes, and Anderson) affirmed. Applying Intervest Construction, Inc. v. Canterbury Estate Homes, Inc. and Home Design Services, Inc. v. Turner Heritage Homes Inc., the court treated architectural floor plans as compilations: only the original arrangement of common elements is protected, not a four-three split layout or other industry-standard ideas. Shared rooms in a similar overall layout were not enough. The Duke plan differed in dimensions, wall placement, and the presence, arrangement, and function of features (including garage versus hobby-room treatment). Those differences, the court held, were significant at the protectable level, so there was no genuine issue of substantial similarity. A “mirror image” theory of infringement was rejected where the plans were not merely reflected copies.
The district court’s judgment was affirmed.
Results depend on the facts of each case and are not a guarantee of any particular outcome.
Second District Reverses Partition Summary Judgment in Lupo v. Lawson
Second District Reverses Partition Summary Judgment in Lupo v. Lawson
Lupo v. Lawson, 301 So. 3d 366 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020)
The Law Office of David W. Smith obtained a reversal in the Florida Second District Court of Appeal for John Lupo in a Sarasota County partition action.
Mr. Lupo and Jennifer Lawson bought a residence in 2016 as joint tenants with right of survivorship. Ms. Lawson later sued to partition the property and for a fifty/fifty split of sale proceeds. The circuit court (Judge Andrea McHugh) granted her motion for summary judgment. She had filed no sworn affidavits. Mr. Lupo opposed the motion with a sworn affidavit that he paid the $77,792.59 deposit and down payment, that she contributed nothing to the down payment, and that after March 2018 he paid half the mortgage and all utilities and maintenance.
A unanimous panel (Judge Sleet, joined by Judges Badalamenti and Rothstein-Youakim) reversed. Before allocating partition-sale proceeds, a trial court must determine each party's ownership percentage and then each party's share of reimbursable post-closing expenses. Mr. Lupo's affidavit created a genuine issue of material fact on how the proceeds should be allocated. Summary judgment was therefore improper. The case was remanded for further proceedings.
Results depend on the facts of each case and are not a guarantee of any particular outcome.
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